Rosa Del Mar

Issue 12 2026-01-12

Rosa Del Mar

Daily Brief

Issue 12 2026-01-12

Hyperliquid spot ticker auctions generated roughly $25M in Q1 2025 and fell to under $1M in Q4 as auctions

Issue 12 Edition 2026-01-12 9 min read
General
Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-02-06 16:59

Key takeaways

  • Hyperliquid spot ticker auctions generated roughly $25M in Q1 2025 and fell to under $1M in Q4 as auctions largely disappeared.
  • Greater transparency in how teams spend revenue is expected to enable better value-accrual mechanisms in the future and reduce the need for extreme buyback policies.
  • Reported Hyperliquid spot 24-hour volume is about $61M, with HYPE/USDC about $36M and IF/USDC about $21M while most other spot pairs are under $10M per day.
  • BLP is Hyperliquid’s native portfolio margin system and entered a pre-alpha rollout in late December with a 5 million USDC supply cap and USDC-only support.
  • Approximately 7–8% of Hyperliquid volume is said to come from builder codes, and Hyperliquid has been giving up around 50% of fees on certain products as a growth incentive.

Sections

Hyperliquid Spot Listing Mechanism And Incentives

The spot program is gated by recurring ticker auctions, creating upfront costs for deployers and adding execution and trust risks via third-party deployments and revenue splitting. The corpus reports a sharp decline in ticker-auction revenue over time alongside low asset coverage, implying the mechanism is not currently producing broad listings. A key unresolved point is whether early success depended on a single dominant deployer and whether decentralizing deployers reduces effective platform revenue via changed buyback behavior.

  • Hyperliquid spot ticker auctions generated roughly $25M in Q1 2025 and fell to under $1M in Q4 as auctions largely disappeared.
  • The outsourced listing model has two core risks: Hyperliquid must trust third-party deployers for safe/effective builds, and Hyperliquid loses listing revenue because it is split 50/50 with deployers.
  • Only about 10 of the top 100 spot assets by market cap are listed on Hyperliquid, and major assets like XRP, BNB, and LINK are unavailable.
  • Deploying a spot asset on Hyperliquid requires winning a Dutch auction for a ticker that runs every 31 hours, creating an upfront ticker acquisition cost in addition to liquidity provision.
  • Hyperliquid’s outsourced spot listing model initially worked well when Unit effectively monopolized deployments, including BTC and ETH listings and launches like XBL and PUMP.
  • As multiple deployers enter, Hyperliquid’s listing revenue capture may drop because Unit previously recycled its share into HYPE buybacks, effectively resembling full revenue to Hyperliquid.

Buybacks As Token Value-Accrual And Credibility Mechanism Under Regulatory Constraints

Buybacks are repeatedly framed as a practical substitute for equity-like tokenholder rights that are described as hard to implement due to regulatory and KYC burdens. The corpus emphasizes buybacks as both an investor-signaling device and a simplification for valuation via revenue-to-net-buy-pressure mapping. A key dispute is not whether buybacks matter, but whether they are effectively mandatory “table stakes” versus a capital-allocation optimization. Transparency is flagged as a potential future unlock that could reduce reliance on extreme buyback signaling.

  • Greater transparency in how teams spend revenue is expected to enable better value-accrual mechanisms in the future and reduce the need for extreme buyback policies.
  • Buybacks are presented as a valuation bridge because direct token-equity rights are blocked by current regulation and would require heavy KYC to implement.
  • Buybacks are framed as table stakes for demonstrating token value rather than purely an optimization question about the highest-ROI use of capital.
  • Programmatic buybacks are described as an efficient way to signal that a token should be valued similarly to equity.
  • Buybacks are described as a market response to prior unsustainable tokenomics where heavy supply dumping and weak value capture made many tokens feel uninvestable.
  • Routing revenue into token buybacks is described as providing an easy valuation framework by linking protocol revenue, circulating supply, and expected annual net buy pressure.

Spot Liquidity, Market Bootstrapping, And Ux Fragmentation

Spot appears to be in a low-volume equilibrium: low taker flow and concentrated volume reduce incentives for deployers and liquidity providers. Listings without dedicated market-making support are described as struggling to bootstrap depth. Decentralized representations can fragment liquidity and confuse users if tickers mask different wrappers of the same underlying asset. Institutional custody willingness is identified as a gating variable for scaling spot volume but remains unknown.

  • Reported Hyperliquid spot 24-hour volume is about $61M, with HYPE/USDC about $36M and IF/USDC about $21M while most other spot pairs are under $10M per day.
  • A key open question is whether funds and large traders are willing to custody spot assets on Hyperliquid.
  • Hyperliquid spot has low taker flow and is perceived primarily as a perps DEX, reducing incentives to deploy new spot assets.
  • Spot market fragmentation and UX confusion can arise from multiple representations of the same underlying asset being displayed as the same ticker (example given: uBTC/USDC displayed as BTC/USDC).
  • There is uncertainty over whether Hyperliquid should prioritize new launches versus backfilling established large-cap assets, and some recent listings may be more relationship-driven than driven by market demand.
  • Some recent spot listings were done without a third-party market maker, making it harder to bootstrap liquidity and discouraging other deployers when early markets underperform.

Blp Rollout: Borrow-Lend-Like Margin And Rate-Driven Liquidity Routing

BLP is described as a capped, USDC-only pre-alpha with early, low utilization consistent with testing constraints. Functionally, it resembles a borrow-lend venue for margin usage rather than a broad, multi-asset portfolio margin system at this stage. The corpus asserts that simple, gasless transfers between HyperEVM and Hypercore make venue choice rate-sensitive, suggesting rapid reallocation of borrowing/supplying based on rate spreads. A proposed reserve-factor-style cut introduces a potential non-trading revenue stream, but magnitude depends on future scale.

  • BLP is Hyperliquid’s native portfolio margin system and entered a pre-alpha rollout in late December with a 5 million USDC supply cap and USDC-only support.
  • Whether users borrow on Felix or via BLP is described as largely rate-driven arbitrage because asset transfer between HyperEVM and Hypercore is simple, near-instant, and gasless.
  • As of this discussion, about 3.3 million USDC had been supplied into BLP, with low per-account supply and borrow caps and low earned rates consistent with early testing.
  • Hyperliquid’s BLP design includes taking about a 10% reserve-factor-style cut of interest.
  • Despite being described as portfolio margin, BLP currently resembles a traditional borrow-lend model where lenders supply USDC and borrowers borrow USDC to trade on margin.

Vertical Integration Pressure: Front-End Ownership Vs Outsourcing

The corpus suggests Hyperliquid is being pushed to own the user interface because interfaces can monetize more effectively than pure backend liquidity. This introduces strategic tension for third-party builders if the core venue internalizes high-value primitives and UI surfaces. Separately, builder-code volume and fee give-ups are cited as meaningful distribution levers, implying that net monetization depends on how much revenue is shared or rebated versus retained.

  • Approximately 7–8% of Hyperliquid volume is said to come from builder codes, and Hyperliquid has been giving up around 50% of fees on certain products as a growth incentive.
  • Hyperliquid appears to be shifting emphasis back toward owning the user and the front end rather than only being a liquidity backend.
  • Competition from other perps venues has pressured Hyperliquid to strengthen its interface because front ends can earn materially more per dollar of volume than backend venues.
  • Hyperliquid is expected to face a choice between true outsourcing and increasingly building core products in-house, with BLP and liquid staking cited as logical internal builds that could pressure third-party protocols on HyperEVM.
  • Hyperliquid is expected to keep investing in its own UI because controlling the interface is viewed as too valuable to give up.

Watchlist

  • A key open question is whether funds and large traders are willing to custody spot assets on Hyperliquid.
  • Greater transparency in how teams spend revenue is expected to enable better value-accrual mechanisms in the future and reduce the need for extreme buyback policies.
  • BLP could divert borrowing flows from Felix for users who borrow stables against volatile assets to trade on Hyperliquid, but the impact is unclear because BLP is still gated and early.

Unknowns

  • What specific changes caused ticker auctions to largely disappear and revenue to drop from roughly $25M (Q1 2025) to under $1M (Q4)?
  • What are the current ticker auction clearing prices, participation levels, and deployer ROI after accounting for liquidity provision requirements?
  • For each bridged or wrapped spot representation, what is the custody/bridge security model (e.g., multisig vs other designs), and how is it disclosed to users?
  • Are funds and large traders willing to custody spot assets on Hyperliquid at scale, and what constraints (policy, risk, compliance) drive their decision?
  • How large can BLP become after pre-alpha gating is removed (cap increases, asset support expansion), and what borrow demand will it attract?

Investor overlay

Read-throughs

  • Spot listing demand and monetization may be structurally weaker than expected, given ticker auction revenue fell from roughly 25M in Q1 2025 to under 1M in Q4 and most spot pairs show under 10M daily volume.
  • Net fee capture may be lower than gross activity implies because around 7 to 8% of volume comes from builder codes and the venue has given up around 50% of fees on certain products as growth incentives.
  • BLP could become a meaningful non trading revenue and retention lever if it scales beyond gated USDC only pre alpha, potentially rerouting borrow demand from external venues and increasing internal stickiness.

What would confirm

  • Sustained recovery in ticker auction activity, with clearer clearing prices, participation, and deployer ROI alongside broader spot pair coverage and more evenly distributed spot volumes.
  • Improving spot depth and daily volumes beyond the top pairs, plus evidence that funds and large traders custody spot assets on the venue at scale.
  • BLP cap increases, asset support expansion, and rising utilization after gating is removed, along with observable rate driven flow migration into BLP.

What would kill

  • Ticker auctions remain largely absent and revenue stays near the under 1M level while spot volumes stay concentrated in a few pairs, indicating spot fails to bootstrap.
  • Fee give ups remain high or expand, keeping net monetization muted despite activity, and builder code share grows without offsetting retention benefits.
  • BLP remains capped, USDC only, and low utilization for an extended period, with minimal evidence of borrowing flow diversion or meaningful reserve factor style revenue.

Sources